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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of economic resources on the likelihood of out-of-
wedlock childbearing and the consequent family formation behaviour after such an event.
Theanalysisis undertakenbyspecifyinga multi-state, multi-spell duration model, with dy-
namic interactions. The results suggest that the economic resources which young women
face are indeed important, not only as determinants of premarital childbearing, but also for
how out-of-wedlock childbearing is resolved. Simulations indicates that welfare generos-
ity and family resources are the most important determinants, whereas personal earnings
potential plays a less important role.
1. Introduction
Over the last three decades family formation behaviour among young adults in the US has
changed dramatically in several ways. One important dimension of this changing pattern
is the sharp increase in the proportion of children living in single parent families. This is
of course due to the steep rise in marital dissolution as well as the rise in out-of-wedlock
childbearing. In 1998 as many as 10 percent of all children lived in single headed families
in which the mother had never been married, a number that constitutes around 40 percent
ofall children livinginsingleheadedfamilies(Willis1999). Anothertroublingissue isthat
given a premarital birth, a relatively large proportion remains unmarried for relatively long
periodsandinmanycasesthemothersdonotmarrythebiologicalfatheratall. Brien(1997)
shows, however, that this varies substantially by race. Among blacks, for instance, only 26
percent of those women who experienced an out-of-wedlock birth marries the biological
father within three years of the birth. Among whites, on the other hand, the equivalent
figure is 78 percent, whereas the figure was around 40 percent for Hispanics.
These changes in household formation have important policy implications. There is a
￿ The paper is based on my PhD thesis undertaken at Department of Economics, University of Bristol. I would
like to thank Simon Burgess, Andrew Chesher, John Ermisch, Carol Propper and David Winter for very use-
ful discussions and comments on this work. I am also indepted to Francesco Billari, Janet Currie, Montezuma
Dumangane, Jan Hoem, Jennifer Ireland, Hans-Peter Kohler, Tony Lancaster, Paris Nearchou and Kees Jan van
Garderen, who all provided valuable comments and suggestions. The responsibility of any remaining errors lies
with the author.
1serious concern over the retreat from the traditional pattern of family formation. In partic-
ular, single parent families are associated with a higher incidence of poverty and welfare
dependency. Growing up in a single parent family, therefore, generally lowers the welfare
of the child, both in terms of educational achievement and other important child outcomes.
Several authors have investigated how economic variables are related to pre-marital
childbearing. In this paper the family formation process is extended beyond the event of
out-of-wedlock childbearing. It provides therefore a more complete picture of the process
of out-of-wedlock childbearing and its relation to economic resources. The questions we
aim to answer are: How do economic incentives affect the likelihood of premarital child-
bearing? Whatistheroleofeconomicresourcesonfamilyformationdecisionstakingplace
after premarital childbearing? What isthe relative importance of the different economic re-
sourcesonthefamilyformationprocess? Wedistinguishthreesourcesofeconomicsupport
and economic opportunities, which are likely to influence these decisions: 1) Family re-
sources, 2) own personal resources, and 3) state welfare support.
These issues are investigated by specifying a dynamic econometric model with mul-
tiple destinations and multiple spells. This recognises the fact that marriage and fertility
transitions are highly inter-related dimensions of a joint family formation process. The
econometric model is similar to the mixed multivariate proportional hazard models as out-
lined by van den Berg (2000).
The empirical model is highly non-linear and includes dynamic interactions, a feature
that makes the parameter estimates hard to interpret alone. Moreover, they are not neces-
sarilyveryinformativeforthepurposeofpolicyanalysis. Wethereforeundertakeadetailed
simulationanalysisasameansofperformingsensitivityanalysisoftheparameterestimates
with respect to some crucial statistics on out-of-wedlock childbearing behaviour.
The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature and
discusses theoretical issues. Section 3 presents the empirical model and the data. Section 4
discusses the covariates. Section 5 presents the results, section 6 presents the simulations,
whereas section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Background and previous research
In general economic theory defines the relationship between economic resources and fam-
ily formation behaviour as being rather complex. This is particularly the case for out-of-
wedlock childbearing since this is not only a particular aspect of fertility behaviour - it is
also a crucial part of the marriage formation process. Thus theories aiming at explaining
the role of economic resources in out-of-wedlock childbearing have to take both of these
aspect into account (Willis 1999). This section provides an economic perspective of the
role played by one’s own personal resources, state welfare support, and family resources
in explaining family formation behaviour. The section ends with a review of the empirical
literature.
In the simple economic setting, marital fertility is explained in terms of opportunity
costs of children together with the notion of child quality (Becker 1965; Becker & Lewis
1973). Assuming that child quality is exogenous, the basic economic framework predicts
2that increased levels of personal resources, normally measured in terms of labour earnings,
reduces the demand for children2. In terms of search models of marriage formation, high
personal earnings is predicted to increase the person’s marriage prospects, and therefore
reduce the risk of having children outside of marriage. This can be thought of as a good
catch effect and reflects that marriage offer rates are higher among high earning women,
increasing the probability of marriage. At the same time, however, women might become
moreselectiveiftheyrealisethattheyareattractiveinthemarriagemarket, whichofcourse
reduces the probability of marriage.
High personal earnings is likely to reduce the importance of parental support, as well as
theincomenormallyreceivedfromaspousewithinmarriage. Thisresemblesaself-reliance
effect associated with high levels of personal resources (Aassve et al (2000)), which pre-
dicts not only that young women are more likely to leave the parental home astheir income
increases, but also that marriage becomes less important as an institution to start their own
family. The latter highlights the important role of the spouse’s earnings potential in the
marriage formation process. Willis (1999) shows that under certain conditions, women
might consider out-of-wedlock childbearing to be more beneficial compared to childbear-
ing within marriage. In particular Willis shows that this might be the case when, first of
all, women have an income which is high enough that they are willing to rear children with
theirownresourcesonly,second,thequalityofsinglemenispoor,and third,thereisexcess
supply of women in the marriage market. Willis argues that under such circumstances the
gains resulting from coordinating resources within marriage is not large enough to induce
marriage, and hence, marital childbearing.
An issue that has received considerable attention recently is the alleged effect of gen-
erous welfare schemes on out-of-wedlock childbearing among young women. The policy
implication, it is often claimed, is that welfare benefits, normally biased in favour of sin-
gle headed families with low income and dependent children only, tend to induce out-of-
wedlock childbearing (eg. Becker 1991; Rosenzweig 1999). Thus, entering parenthood
at an early age, and possible before marriage, might be considered more attractive among
women for which the future economic prospects are limited due to social exclusion and
discrimination. It is common to use the variation in generosity levels across states in order
to identify the effect on pre-marital childbearing. The central problem of this approach is
that the level of welfare benefits might be set endogenously by the authorities. State dif-
ferentials in terms of welfare generosity are, at least to some extent, likely to serve as an
indicatoroffundamentaldifferencesinstateattitudestowardsout-of-wedlockchildbearing.
Thus a positive relationship between welfare generosity and out-of-wedlock childbearing
might reflect the authorities’ response to high rates of premarital childbearing, rather than
young women responding to the levels of generosity.
Parents are likely to be an important source of financial support in the early years of
adulthood, asitisnotuncommon forparentsto provide financialsupportfor the offspring’s
educationalcareeraswellashelpingout inthecostlyventureofsettinguptheir ownhouse-
2 This result is based on the assumption that child rearing is undertaken by the parents. Ermisch (1989) shows
that this simple theoretical prediction may be different when the household has the opportunity to purchase child
care externally. Also see Ermisch and Cigno (1989) for an economic analysis of the timing and tempo of fertility
decisions.
3hold. These transfers will, of course, influence the offspring’s family formation behaviour.
In general we would expect the level of family income to be negatively associated with
out-of-wedlock childbearing. There are several reasons for this. In terms of young adults
leaving the parental home, which is linked both to marriage and fertility timing, we ex-
pect high levels of parental resources to increase the utility associated with living in the
parental home. Thus, high levels of parental resources makes one’s own family formation
less attractive, all else being equal. Search and matching models of marriage, on the other
hand, predicts that high parental resources signal, at least in part, the quality of the young
individual as a marriage partner. Thus, a high level of parental resources will increase the
marriage offer rate, which in turn will make marriage more likely. A consequence of this
positive effect on marriage formation is that higher parental income will make premarital
childbearing less likely. In summary, therefore, we would expect the negative effect from
high family income levels to be stronger for pre-marital childbearing, than for marriage.
Therelationshipbetweenparentalresourcesandtheoffspring’sfamilyformationtiming
canalsobeviewedintermsofintergenerationaleffectsderivedfrompreferencesandnorms.
Parents’ educational attainment and working career, which to a large extent determines
family income, are highly correlated with the offspring’s educational choice and career
pattern. This is therefore an equally plausible explanation for the negative relationship
between family income and timing of the family formation process. Thus the effect of
familyresourcesonfamilyformationrequiresabroaderinterpretationthanjustthefinancial
incentives associated with intergenerational transfers.
The majority of the empirical work on the issue of premarital childbearing has taken
a sociological viewpoint towards explanation, thus emphasising the importance of family
background and intergenerational effects. Cooksey (1987) for instance, find a strong nega-
tiveassociationbetweenout-of-wedlockchildbearingandparentseducation. Shealsofinds
that young women growing up in single headed families have a higher risk of experienc-
ing out-of-wedlock childbearing. Antel (1992) supports this view, as he finds premarital
childbearingto be positively associatedwith mothers’ welfare dependency. Y amaguchiand
Kandel (1987) finds that early cohabitation and poor performance at school, as well as use
of illicit drugs and dropping out of school are positively associated with premarital preg-
nancies. Other studies have suggested that stressful events, such as rapid changes in family
structure as well as frequent changes in household location at young age, are positively as-
sociated with out-of-wedlock childbearing (Antel 1988; Abrahamse et al 1988). Y et others
have emphasised the role of imperfect information among young adults in terms of oppor-
tunitiesin the labour market, as well as lack of understanding of the negative consequences
normally associated with premarital childbearing (see Hanson et al 1988 as well as Antel
(1988) for evidence of this hypothesis). Another strand of this literature has emphasised
the role of marriage markets in explaining out-of-wedlock childbearing. This hypothesis
suggest that women living in areas with poor marriage markets, normally measured by the
number of available mates, are more likely to bear children outside marriage. South (1996)
finds that white women are less likely to marry, and hence more likely to bear children
out of wedlock, in areas where men face relatively unstable employment opportunities and
poor earnings prospects. South and Lloyd (1992) find a significant relationship between
the ratio of males to females and the likelihood of experiencing premarital childbearing.
4There are relatively few papers taking an economic viewpoint. The most detailed work
to date on the relationship between premarital childbearing and welfare generosity is un-
dertaken by Rosenzweig (1999). Using data from the NLSY , and making control for state
and cohort fixed effects, he finds a strong relationship between AFDC levels and premari-
tal childbearing among those aged 19-22, whereas those aged 14-18 were insensitive to the
level of welfare available to them. The results are supported by Hoffman and Foster (2000)
who replicated the work by Rosenzweig (1999) with data from the PSID.
Duncan & Hoffman (1990) investigated the effect of welfare generosity, measured in
terms of AFDC levels, and economic opportunities on the incidence of premarital child-
bearing among black teenagers using data from the PSID. Using logistic regression they
found the effect of welfare generosity to only have a weak, and insignificant, effect on
premarital childbearing. In contrast, they found a negative relationship between family in-
come and out-of-wedlock childbearing. An et al (1993), also using the PSID, found that
the mother’seducation, which ispositively associated withthe offspring’s educational level
and future earnings, was negatively associated with pre-marital childbearing, though they
found no strong link with the welfare generosity level.
Implementing a nested logit model which includes premarital pregnancy, pregnancy
resolution, and the occurrence of marriage before childbirth in three different stages, Lund-
berg and Plotnick (1995) find a relatively strong association between welfare generosity
and the incidence of premarital childbearing for white women, but no strong effect among
black women.
3. Data and empirical specification
3.1 Model specification
The family formation process is here modelled as a duration model with multiple destina-
tions and multiple spells. This econometric specification is similar to the mixed multivari-
ate proportional hazard as outlined by van den Berg (2000), and recognises the fact that
marriage and fertility transitions are inter-related dimensions of a joint family formation
process. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the econometric model.
All women start the family formation process as being single without children. They
can then either marry or have a child and become a single mother. The single mother will
eithermarry, or have anotherchildoutsideofmarriage. Alternativelyshemight stayonasa
single mother until the censoring date. Table 1 lists all the possible family status categories
included in the econometric model. Family status 5 and 6 represent second births and are
treated here as absorbing states. Thus if the woman does not reach second birth within
the end of the survey she becomes censored. It is clear from figure 1 that the empirical
model also incorporates marital fertility and marital dissolution but these transitions are
not analysed here.
Themovementsbetweenthefamilystatesarerestrictedaccordingtotable2, andhasthe





























Figure 1: Structure of empirical model. Family status are denoted by the rounded square
boxes, wheras the arrows denotes the family formation transitions. Transitions denoted by
the dotted arrows are also estimated as part of the econometric model, but not analysed
here.
Table 1: Listing of family statuses:
Family status 1: ’’ N o t M a r r i e d , N o C h i l d re n’’
Family status 2: ’ ’Married , No Children’ ’
Family status 3: ’ ’Not Married , One Child’ ’
Family status 4: ’ ’Married , One Child’ ’
Family status 5: ’ ’Not Married, Two Children’ ’
Family status 6: ’ ’Married, Two Children’ ’
6Table 2: Listing of all possible family formation transitions.
Marriage transitions:
’’ Not Married & No Children’’ (1)  ’’ Married & No Children’’ ( 2f)
’’ Not Married & No Children’’ (1)  ’’ Married & No Children’’ ( 2s)
’’ Not Married & One Child’’ (3)  ’’ Married & One Child’’ (4)
Fertility transitions:
’’ Not Married & No Children’’ (1)  ’’ Not Married & One Child’’ ( 3)
’’ Married & No Children’’ (2)  ’’ Married & One Child’’ (4)
’’ Not Married & One Child’’ (3)  ’’ Not Married & Two Children’’ ( 5)
’’ Married & One Child’’ (4)  ’’ Married & Two Children’’ (6)
Marital dissolution transitions:
’’ Married & No Children’’ (2)  ’’ Not Married & No Children’’ (1)
’’ Married & One Child’’ (4)  ’’ Not Married & One Child’’ (3)
sample undertakes a transition 42 or a transition 31. Second, women giving birth to
twins are excluded, which rules out transitions 26a n d1 5. And finally, both marriages
and fertility events are recorded by exact dates, which means that a marriage will never
take place at the same time as a fertility event3, excluding transitions 14 and 45.
Table 2 summarises the family formation transitions that take place within the specified
framework. Marriagecanoccurthroughtwodifferentroutes. Marriagebeforechildbearing
isdenoted asa transition12, whereasmarriage after childbearing isdenoted as34. All
subsequent marriages (denoted 12(s)), are treated as one process and are separate from
first marriages. Fertility events take place through four different routes. The first is a
premarital birth and is denoted as a transition 13. The second is first childbirth within
marriage (transition 24). The third is to have a second birth outside marriage, (denoted
as 35), and the fourth is to have a second birth within marriage, and is denoted 46. In
this framework we analyse the family formation process up until the second birth, which
implies that state 5 and state 6 are absorbing.
The econometric model, for which the details are given in Appendix A, is a competing
riskspecificationwithmultiple spells4. Inthisframeworktheprobabilityoftransitingfrom













ln denotes the hazard function for a transition from i to k in the r’th spell, x(t)
denotes the vector of covariates, some of which are time-varying, u is a random variable
capturing unobserved heterogeneity in spell ,a n du
lm denotes the integrated hazard.
It is not possible to observe all individual specific characteristics that determines be-
haviour, but it is necessary to control for these unobserved characteristics in order to avoid
￿ If, on the other hand, events were recorded in discrete time, the likelihood of observing marriage at the same
time as child birth would be relevant. This would in general complicate the modelling scheme considerably.
e The model is implemented and estimated using the SAS matrix language (IML). Estimation of the most
elaborate model is relatively computer intensive, and it takes about 5 to 6 hours to perform one single iteration
using a Sun Spark-station. The computer programs are available from the author on request, although no support
can be given.
7biasedparameterestimates(seeLancaster(1990)fordetails). Hereunobservedheterogene-
ity is captured by the random variable  which entails introduction of a constant ’’covari-
ate’’ in 
 It is specified as a univariate discrete distribution with two points of support
 (i.e. masspoints), and with associated probability masses 
 and the expected value of 








p  . Thisissimilartothenon-parametricmasspoint
specification employed by Heckman and Singer (1984) although here there is no search for
a likelihood maximising the number of mass points5. An advantage of using this non-
parametric approach is that it avoids making restrictive assumptions about the distribution
function of . A drawback, however, is that the interpretation of  becomes difficult. Since
 is estimated non-parametrically, it will capture any unobserved heterogeneity which may
arise from a range of different sources. It is difficult, therefore, to make any statements
other than that positive valuesof reflects’’mover’’ behaviour and negative valuesreflects
’’stayer’’ behaviour. Section5providesatentativeinterpretationofthemasspointsregarding
marriage after out-of-wedlock childbearing.
3.2 The NLSY sample
W eu seasa mpleo f3 71 5 6 womenfromtheNationalLongitudinal Surveyofyouth(NLSY).
The data is taken from 1979 to 1992 and the age distribution is in the range 14 to 20 years
when first interviewed in 1979. The data reveal quite different patterns of the family for-
mation process with respect to the different race groups. Black women marry later than
both Hispanic and white women and Hispanic women marry at an earlier age than whites.
Black women have first premarital birth at a younger age than the other race groups. For
second premarital birth there is no great difference between Hispanic and black women.
Child bearing within marriage takes place on average three years later than child bearing
outside of marriage, and the birth of a second child within marriage takes place 1.7 years
after the first birth.
Every woman in the sample is recorded with a ’’transition history’’ defined over the
familystateslistedintable1andthedurationsbetweenthefamilyformationevents. Table4
showsthefrequencydistributionofthesesampletransitiontypes. Forinstancethetransition
D The current specification implies that the masspoints are independent across spells, which invokes the as-
sumption that unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated across spells. This is in contrast to Aassve et al (2000)
where unobserved heterogeneity, again modelled by the use of non-parametric masspoints, is allowed to be corre-
lated across spells. However, including past duration variables explanatory covariates, as is done here, precludes
this possibility. This is simply because the correlated unobserved heterogeneity terms will themselves be corre-
lated with past durations and occurences, and consequently produce biased parameter estimates. Also note that
the current specification does not allow for correlation across destination states since we assume independence of
the competing risks. This is in contrast to Lillard et al (1999), who identify correlation in unobserved behaviour
between the hazard of marriage and the hazard of conception.
S The original sample includes 6283 women. The reduction in sample size is mainly caused by missing val-
ues in the covariates, as well as incomplete family histories. The number of missing values were reduced by
implementing data cleaning procedures as suggested in Cole & Currie (1994).
8Table 3: Mean age for transitions
Age at: All Whites Hispanics Blacks
first transition 22.68 22.98 22.23 22.29
first marriage (prior to birth) 21.85 21.93 21.29 22.15
first marriage (after 1st birth) 22.29 22.08 21.49 22.89
first premarital birth 20.11 20.22 20.33 19.99
second premarital birth 22.96 23.71 22.68 22.75
first birth (married) 23.22 23.48 22.43 23.03
second birth (married) 24.92 25.05 24.64 24.76
9Table 4: Frequency table of family transition histories, sample versus simulated (in brack-
ets). 1="Notmarried,nochildren,2="Married,nochildren",3="Notmarried,onechild",
4 = "Married, one child", 5 = "Not married, two children, 6 = "Married, two children".

All Whites Hispanics Blacks
Transition type Sample Sample Simul. Sample Simul. Sample Simul.
1 13.8 13.7 (11.6) 12.3 (10.4) 15.0 (12.3)
12 10.8 13.6 (13.0) 7.7 (8.8) 6.6 (4.7)
13 5.2 2.2 (1.1) 5.8 (2.2) 11.4 (7.4)
121 2.1 2.4 (3.5) 1.6 (2.1) 1.7 (1.6)
124 10.1 12.8 (12.8) 8.6 (10.9) 5.0 (5.4)
134 1.6 1.4 (1.3) 1.0 (1.5) 2.3 (2.7)
135 11.8 3.6 (4.2) 9.6 (12.3) 31.1 (33.1)
1212 1.4 2.1 (1.6) 0.8 (1.0) 0.3 (0.3)
1213 0.3 0.5 (0.2) 0.2 (0.2) 0.0 (0.3)
1243 1.6 1.5 (1.2) 2.1 (0.7) 1.2 (0.9)
1246 27.9 33.2 (34.8) 36.1 (32.3) 11.0 (13.0)
1343 0.2 0.2 (1.3) 0.3 (1.8) 0.2 (3.4)
1346 6.8 4.7 (3.0) 7.7 (4.7) 10.8 (4.5)
12121 0.2 0.2 (0.1) 0.2 (0.0) 0.1 (0.1)
12124 0.9 1.3 (1.3) 0.6 (0.7) 0.2 (0.2)
Other 5.5 6.5 (6.8) 5.7 (8.7) 2.9 (8.1)
sequence’’married-firstchild-secondchild’’ willproducetransitionhistory1246. Table
4 shows that this is in fact the most common form of family formation and as many as 27.9
percent of the sample belong to this group. 13.8 percent of the sample do not make any
transitions. A large proportion of the sample are right censored as only 50.8 percent of the
samplereachtheabsorbingstates(state5orstate6). 10.8percent ofthesamplegetmarried
but have no children (history type 12) and 10.1 percent of the sample are censored when
they are married and have one child (124). 5.2 percent are censored as unmarried with
one child (13) and 11.8 percent are censored as unmarried with two children (135)
The transition type frequencies vary substantially between the three race groups. 11.4
percent of blacks have transition history 1 3 whereas only 2.2 percent of whites belong to
this group. The percentages show that black women are less likely to marry before first
child birth. The most dramatic differences are for transition types 135 and 1246. 31.1
percent of blacks are having both first and second childbirth out-of-wedlock, whereas only
3.6 percent of white women follow this route. Only 11 percent of black women under-
take the most common route of 1246 compared to 33.2 and 36.1 percent for whites and
Hispanics respectively.
4. Empirical issues
4.1 Personal earnings capacity
We use the predicted wage rate as an exogenous measure of the young women’s earnings




Probit labour force participation equation
Covariate Coefficient Std. error
Age 0.070 (0.001)
Age squared -0.0011 (0.00001)
Years of education 0.092 (0.001)
African American -0.029 (0.012)
Living in urban area 0.067 (0.008)
Currently enrolled -2.923 (0.053)
+ State and year dummies (N = 184349)
OLS regression of log wage
Covariate Coefficient Std. error
Mills ratio 0.775 (0.042)
Age 0.091 (0.002)
Age squared -0.0012 (0.00003)
Years of education 0.114 (0.002)
African American -0.042 (0.005)
Living in urban area 0.148 (0.004)
+ State and year dummies (N=79224, R
2=0.23)
is used to estimate the wage equation from which the predicted wages are derived. The
motivation for using a large external data-set for this purpose is twofold. First, the NLSY
sample is relatively modest (3715 women), which implies that we might encounter groups
withrelativelysmallnumberofobservations,inwhichthepredictedwagesmightbebiased.
The other problem associated with using the sample to predict wages is the possible bias
generated by theearly exitof respondents into theabsorbing states(second childbirth). The
observed wage rates of the remaining sample (those who make transitions later), therefore,
may not be representative for their age-group. Using data from the CPS, which contains
around 60000 respondents overcomes both of these problems.
Weapplyatwostepprocedureinordertocontrolforself-selectionintothelabourforce,
where women are defined as participating in the labour force if they report the usual hours
worked in a week to be positive. The first step consist of a Probit model of labour force
participation, from whichthe Inverse MillsRatio (IMR) iscomputed. This isthen included
as a covariate in the second step which is an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator on
log wages.
Table 5 shows the results. They conform well to the existing literature. Women with
higher education or who live in urban areas tend to have higher participation rates. Black
women have slightly lower participation rates. Being currently enrolled in a school or
university has a strong negative impact on participation. The OLS regression shows that
wages are positively associated with age but at a declining rate. Living in an urban area is
associated with higher wages, whereas the coefficient on education is within the standard
range reported in the literature. Black women earn less than Hispanics and whites.
These estimates are used to construct the predicted wage levels7, which consequently
. The fact that women are assumed to start their family formation process at the age of 13, and wages are only
estimated from the year starting from 1978, implies that out of sample predictions have been undertaken.
11Table 6: Ordinary Least Square estimation of family income on parental and background
characteristics.

OLS regression of family income
Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Age of mother 0.021 (0.014)
Age of mother squared -0.0002 (0.00016)
Mother completed high school 0.233 (0.035)
Mother has college degree 0.302 (0.048)
Mother works part time 0.070 (0.037)
Mother works full time 0.158 (0.032)
Mother had first child as a teenager -0.077 (0.035)
Father completed high school 0.161 (0.035)
Father has college degree 0.285 (0.044)
Father works part time 0.298 (0.054)
Father works full time 0.551 (0.035)




are mapped into the NLSY sample using the background characteristics listed in table 5.
The predicted wage levels are essentially the average wage levels of the group of women to
which the women in the NLSYsample belongto. It is therefore the wage rate the woman is
most likely to expect and is interpreted as a measure of the woman’s expectation regarding
her future earnings potential.
4.2 Parental resources and family income
Parental resources are measured by two alternative specifications of family income. In the
first we use the actual family income as it is reported in 19798 by the NLSY .T h i si st h e
total family income minus the income of the respondent. Asignificant drawback, however,
is that it is not available prior to 1979. Since some women left the parental home prior
to 1979, the actual family income will refer to the partner’s income, and not the parent’s
income. The second specification is meant to overcome this problem. Instead of using the
actual family income in 1979 we construct the predicted family income, based on those
women who still live in the parental home in 1979. The predicted family income is then
mapped onto those women who had left the parental home. Table 6 shows the results of the
OLS regression used to generate the predicted family income variable.
The results conform to our expectations. Age is positively associated with family in-
come, but at a declining rate. The parents educational level is also positively associated
with family income and there is little difference between mother and fathers’ educational
attainment. In terms of parents’ work status the results indicates quite clearly that the work
status of the father dominates. The results also show a negative relationship between fam-
ily income and the timing of the parent’s family formation process, which is measured by
whether the mother gave first birth as a teenager. However, the magnitude is not large and
H The parental income reported in 1979 refers to the income in previous calendar year, i.e. 1978.
12the coefficient is not statistically significant at the five percent level. Finally we see there
is a positive association between income and living in an urban area.
4.3 Women’ educational attainment and other background
variables
Due to the endogeneity of women’s education we have not included this as a covariate in
our specifications. The endogeneity problem is essentially that women who marry or have
a child early in their life may terminate their education in response to these events. Thus
the associated parameter is likely to be biased, and might affect other covariates that are
correlated with educational attainment, such as her earnings. As an alternative we use the
woman’s AFQT score, which is positively correlated with years spent in education, but
have a higher degree of exogeneity with respect to her family formation choices. Given the
positive correlationto the time spent in education, we expect high levelsofAFQT tohavea
delaying effect on marriage, and we might expect it to have a negative effect on premarital
childbearing.
It is important to be aware that many of the explanatory variables will be correlated
with the woman’s educational choice. For instance the predicted family income, which is
a positive function of the parents educational choice - among other things, will reflect the
respondents’ educational attainment. This is simply because there is a strong intergener-
ational correlation in terms of educational choice. Also the respondent’s predicted wages
will be positively associated with education. In fact, as is clear from table 5, the predicted
wage is here a positive function of education.
Inoneofourspecification(table8)weincludecovariatesthatmeasureintergenerational
effects directly. The first is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the mother of
the respondent had less than 12 years of schooling. This is correlated with the women’s
own educational choice, so we expect this to have positive impact on the timing of the
family formation process. The second variable is a dummy variable taking the value one
if the mother had the first birth as a teenager, which should also have positive impact on
the timing of the family formation process. Note that in this particular specification we
use actual family income in 1979 instead of the predicted family income. In all other
specifications the effect of these variables will feed through the predicted family income.
A variable controlling for the family structure of the respondent is also included. This
simply takes the value one if the woman lived with both parents at age 14. Its purpose is
to investigate the hypothesis that stressful events, such as family disruptions at young age,
may affect the offspring’s own family formation.
Finally, the duration until first birth is included as a covariate in the family transitions
taking place after a premarital birth has taken place. The variable is important in the sim-
ulation analysis since the effects of the income variables on the initial family transitions
will feed through to the subsequent transitions.
4.4 Welfare Benefits
We use cross variation in AFDC levels across states as a measure of the welfare generosity.
13In contrast to Rosenzweig (1999) and Hoffman and Foster (2000), the welfare generosity
variable is here implemented as a non-time varying covariate9. In order to control for area
specificeffects,andhenceimprovetheidentificationoftheeffectofAFDClevelson family
formation behaviour, we include the county marriage rates as a covariate. Inclusion of this
variable generally strengthens the effect of welfare levels on out-of-wedlock childbearing,
a result that is similar to the findings by Rosenzweig (1999), as well as by Hoffman and
Foster (2000). However, one should keep in mind that the county marriage rate may not
serve as an ideal instrument to control for the possible endogeneity of welfare benefits as
discussed in section 2
The welfare generosity variable refers to the typical AFDC payment for a two person
family when the respondents’ were aged 20 years old. It would be desirable to use AFDC
levelsthatcouldbematchedtoanearlierageoftherespondents,suchasage14forinstance.
However, in this sample of women, where the age distribution ranges from 14 to 20 in the
first year of observation, no retrospective information regarding their residence is given,
a feature that makes it impossible to trace the state of residence and consequently assign
AFDC levels prior to 1979.
Although a range of welfare schemes were available to the respondents during the ob-
served period, the most common one, and by far the most substantial, were AFDC. Other
welfare schemes, such as foodstamps and medical aid, followed more or less the same eli-
gibility rules set for AFDC. The AFDC levels should therefore be a good representation of
the perceived generosity level in a given state.
5. Results
We present parameter estimates from three different specifications. The preferred speci-
fication is reported in table 7 and includes predicted family income and time varying pre-
dictedwages intheset of covariates. The secondspecification(table 8)usesthereal family
income instead of the predicted levels, and include indicators for mother’s education and
mother’s childbearing timing as covariates. The third specification (table 9) is identical to
the first specification but without the sub sample of black women.
The results indicate substantial differences among the three race groups. White women
marryquickerthanbothHispanicandblackwomen, whereasblackwomenmarryconsider-
ably later than Hispanic women. A reverse picture is apparent for premarital child bearing,
withblackwomenbeingsubstantiallymore likelytoexperience out-of-wedlockchildbear-
ing compared to Hispanic women, and especially white women. Once having experienced
an out-of-wedlock birth, black women are considerable less likely to get married compared
to the other groups, but there are no difference between the race groups in terms of having
a second out-of-wedlock birth.
The family background variables have important effects on the family formation tran-
sitions. Table 8 shows that women whose mother had low educational attainment (ie. less
b The introduction of timevarying variables (predicted wages) complicates the estimation procedure consider-
ably. The main motivation for keeping welfare levels non-time varying was to keep the complexity of the model
on a manageable level.
14than 12 years of schooling) or started their childbearing at a young age, tend to start the
family formation earlier. It is also clear that these intergenerational effects are stronger
in terms of premarital childbearing compared to marriage. The results also indicate a rel-
atively strong association between growing up in a single parent family and premarital
childbearing, although there is no effect on the timing of marriage 10.
The negative AFQT parameter indicates an inverse relationship both to marriage and
out-of-wedlock childbearing. This is according to our expectations, but the parameters are
not generally significant at the five percent level, indicating that it is not a particularly
good proxy for educational attainment. A potential problem here is that the AFQT score is
positively related to the woman’s earnings, implying that the effect of the AFQT is masked
by the predicted wage parameter. The AFQT parameters associated with the subsequent
family transitions are generally insignificant.
Women with high predicted wages are less likely to experience out-of-wedlock child-
bearing and they tend to delay marriage. This delaying effect on marriage is driven by
the education variable included in the wage equation. Spending time in education delays
marriage but increases eventually the earnings. Since this is a sample of young women the
delaying effect of education is strong. Previous estimates (not shown here) where educa-
tional attainment were included as covariates directly, showed indeed that education has a
strongdelayingeffect on marriage. It alsomade the predictedwageparameter becomepos-
itive, aswell as considerablylarger. It shouldalso be noted that the inclusionof educational
attainment had dramatic effects on the AFDC parameter both in the initial transitions, as
well as in the transitions following after premarital childbearing.
Given a premarital birth, we see that predicted wages have quite different effects on
the consequent family formation transitions. High levels now tend to accelerate the transi-
tion into marriage, which has a strong negative effect on having a second child outside of
marriage.
High family income generally delays the initiation of the family formation process,
whichisreflected by the strongnegative coefficientsbothformarriage and out-of-wedlock
childbearing, although it is considerable stronger for the latter. The results shows clearly
that women coming from low income families are more likely to initiate the family forma-
tion process through an out-of-wedlock birth instead of marriage. A comparison of tables
7 and 8 shows that the family income parameter becomes even stronger (more negative)
when the actual family income level is used instead of the predicted levels, especially for
premarital childbearing. This is not unexpected since those who left the parental home
prior to 1979, and therefore more likely to experience a family formation transition, have
been assigned the income of the partner as the family income. The strong downward bias
reported in table 8 is generated by the fact that the income of the partner is considerably
lower than the true family income of the woman.
The level of family income is also important for the family formation process after a
premaritalbirth hastakenplace. Theresultsstronglysuggestthatwomen fromhighincome
￿f This finding is consistent with Aassve at al (2000), where the family formation process is modelled as a com-
peting risk for which the destination states are marriage and independent living, respectively. Their results show
that coming from a disrupted family is posetively associated with independent living and negatively associated
with marriage, although the latter association is generally quite weak.
15families are significantly less likely to have another birth outside marriage. The positive
associationbetweenfamilyincomeandmarriage,althoughnotstatisticallysignificant,sug-
gest that women coming from high income families faces a stronger pressure to legitimise
the child and therefore accelerate marriage.
The results indicate that the AFDC generosity levels are important in terms of the initi-
ation of the family formation process. The associated parameters suggest that state welfare
levels are negatively associated with marriage and positively associated with pre-marital
child bearing. But the results also show that welfare generosity levels have no significant
effect on the resolution of pre-marital childbearing, although the coefficients are of the ex-
pected sign. Thus having entered single motherhood, the welfare variable does not seem to
have much further impact on the family formation process.
As outlined in section 4.4, the main purpose of the county marriage rates is to control
for area specific effects in terms of marriage formation, and consequently out-of-wedlock





In the latter case the parameter is reduced from 0.17 to 0.13, but is still significant. Thus
controlling for area specific effects makes the AFDC parameter stronger13. However, the
difference is not particularly large, and certainly not statistically significant.
Inordertorevealdifferentialsinfamilyformationbehaviouramongtheracegroups,and
consequently, differences in responses to economic incentives, we re-estimated the model
without the sample of black women14. The results are given in table 9. They show in gen-
eral that white and Hispanic women are more responsive to economic incentives as far as
out-of-wedlock childbearing is concerned. For instance, young white and Hispanic women
from stable family background are less likely to experience this event. The association be-
tween the county marriage rate and premarital childbearing is also stronger. The economic
variables also changes. For instance, white and Hispanic women are more responsive to
the AFDC generosity, which confirms earlier findings (Lundberg & Plotnick (1995)). The
predicted wage rate is stronger both in terms of marriage and out-of-wedlock childbearing.
The predicted family income parameter also become stronger in magnitude, although the
difference is not large.
Theparameterestimatesforthefamilyformationtransitionsafterout-of-wedlockchild-
bearing also changes. Predicted family income has a somewhat stronger effect in terms of
second birth outside marriage, while the effect on marriage is weaker. Welfare generos-
ity has no effect on subsequent transitions. The difference in terms of predicted wage is
￿￿ Thisisbasedontheassumptionthathighmarriageratestranslatesintolowerratesofout-of-wedlockchildbearing.
￿2 These results are available from the author on request.
￿￿ This result is in line with the finding by Rosenzweig (1999) and Duncan and Foster (2000), who both shows
that the effect of AFDC on premarital childbearing becomes stronger when state and cohort fixed effects are
controlled for.
￿e Re-estimation on black women only would be desireable, but this was not possible due to the relatively small
sample black women.
16more noticeable. A comparison of tables 9 and 7 shows that the strong negative effect of
predicted wage on second birth outside marriage has almost disappeared. This is an inter-
esting results, since it suggest that there is hardly any disincentive effect from high wages
on having a second birth outside marriage among white and Hispanic women.
Theinclusionofunobservedheterogeneityhasarelativelystrongimpactontheparame-
ter results, especially for the shape parameters of the hazard function. Without this control
the negative duration dependence becomes considerably stronger in all transitions15.I nt h e
first set of transitions, 77.8 percent of the sample is characterised as movers (the masspoint
is around 0.5), whereas the remaining 22.2 percent are assigned a large negative masspoint
of -1.74. After a premarital birth has taken place, the percentages of movers and stayers
are 38.3 and 61.7, respectively.
Although interpretation of the unobserved heterogeneity terms is not straight forward,
the estimated masspoints do lend themselves to a convenient explanation regarding the
transition to marriage from single motherhood. This is rooted in the fact that we are not
distinguishing between single mothers who goes on to marry the true father of the child,
from those who do not16. Consequently the masspoints are likely to identify partners who
prior to the childbirth had relatively strong intensions of marrying, from those who had
less established partnerships. In the former case, we might expect a premarital pregnancy
to accelerate the marriage transition in order to legitimise the child. This will be reflected
by a positive value of 17. The negative value of , on the other hand, will reflect women
who delay marriage after having experienced a premarital birth. These women were likely
tobeinlessstablerelationshipswhenchildbearingtookplace, andare,therefore,lesslikely
to marry the biological father of the child.
6. Sensitivity analysis
The highly nonlinear nature of the our model implies that the parameter estimates are not
necessarily very informative in terms of assessing changes in behaviour from changes in
the explanatory variables. This means that sensitivity analysis of the parameters cannot be
undertaken in a satisfactory fashion without the help of simulations.
The synthetic transition histories, from which the simulated descriptive statistics are
computed, are generated by re-sampling the women in our NLSY sample five times. We
computethreeseparatestatisticswhichadequatelydescribesbehaviourassociatedwithout-
of-wedlock childbearing. These are the number of out-of-wedlock births as a percentage
of the total number of first births, the mean time spent as a single mother, and the number
of women marrying, again measured as a percentage of women experiencing a premarital
￿D The specifications wihout unobserved heterogenetiy are not reported here, but are available from the author
on request.
￿S It would be advantageous to model transitions from single motherhood to marriage as two possible destina-
tions, the first being marriage to the biological father, and the second as marriage to someone that is not the father
of the child. However, having two destinations to marriage, in addition to having a second child outside marriage,
is a non-trivial extension of the model and was beyond the scope of the current analysis.
￿. Evidence of this effect is reported in Lillard et al (1999). They show that the event of a premarital birth
increases the the risk of marriage.
17Table7: Specificationwithpredictedwagesandpredictedfamilyincomeascovariates. A1,
A2, and A3 are slope parameters of the hazard function. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Transitions 12&1 3:
First marriage First birth
before 1st birth before marriage
Covariates Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Intercept -3.592 (0.266) -2.973 (0.316)
White 0.215 (0.074) -0.331 (0.112)
Black -0.814 (0.100) 0.937 (0.110)
Lived with both parents at age 14 0.052 (0.072) -0.314 (0.079)
Marriage rate at county level 0.371 (0.142) 0.380 (0.177)
AFQT score -0.327 (0.185) -0.184 (0.258)
Welfare generosity -0.096 (0.029) 0.175 (0.037)
Predicted family income -0.408 (0.041) -0.739 (0.054)
Predicted wage rate -0.691 (0.243) -0.576 (0.263)
A1 7.658 (0.354) 5.183 (0.338)
A2 1.503 (0.174) 0.158 (0.239)
A3 0.066 (0.346) 0.699 (0.508)
Masspoint 1 [Probability 1] 0.496 [0.778]
Masspoint 2 [Probability 2] -1.742 [0.222]
Transitions 34&3 5:
First marriage Second birth
a f t e r1 s tb i r t h b e f o r em a r r i a g e
Covariates Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Intercept -0.988 (0.517) -1.420 (0.527)
White 0.243 (0.159) -0.152 (0.184)
Black -0.844 (0.166) 0.238 (0.174)
Marriage rate at county level 0.178 (0.287) 0.281 (0.271)
AFQT score 0.348 (0.424) -0.346 (0.411)
Duration until first birth -0.703 (0.234) -0.596 (0.225)
Welfare generosity -0.089 (0.063) 0.083 (0.059)
Predicted family income 0.796 (0.899) -0.238 (0.086)
Predicted wage rate 0.766 (0.571) -1.310 (0.548)
A1 6.662 (1.139) 13.319 (1.421)
A2 2.224 (1.225) -1.464 (1.092)
A3 -1.505 (0.560) -1.280 (0.440)
Masspoint 1 [Probability 1] 1.985 [0.383]
Masspoint 2 [Probability 2] -1.233 [0.617]
N = 3715, LogLik = -5539.1
18Table 8: Specification with real family income in 1978 instead of predicted family income.
A1, A2, and A3 are the slope parameters of the hazard function. Standard errors in paren-
thesis.
Transitions 12&1 3:
Marriage before First birth
childbearing before marriage
Covariates Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Intercept -4,364 (0,285) -4,218 (0,346)
White 0,232 (0,076) -0,270 (0,117)
Black -0,849 (0,101) 0,874 (0,114)
Lived with both parents at age 14 -0,011 (0,071) -0,354 (0,079)
Mother had first birth when teenager 0,375 (0,064) 0,607 (0,079)
Mother has less than 12 years of schooling 0,378 (0,062) 0,681 (0,082)
Marriage rate at county level 0,313 (0,144) 0,333 (0,187)
AFQT score -0,260 (0,184) -0,122 (0,259)
Welfare generosity -0,138 (0,029) 0,127 (0,038)
Real family income in 1978 -0,797 (0,158) -2,689 (0,264)
Predicted wage rate -0,698 (0,239) -0,521 (0,282)
A1 7,747 (0,356) 5,166 (0,332)
A2 1,521 (0,163) 0,283 (0,233)
A3 0,086 (0,352) 0,582 (0,504)
Masspoint 1 [Probability 1] 0,508 [0,779]
Masspoint 2 [Probability 2] -1,787 [0,221]
Transitions 34&3 5:
Marriage after Second birth
first birth before marriage
Covariates Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Intercept -0,950 (0,522) -1,484 (0,535)
White -0,209 (0,183) 0,103 (0,195)
Black -0,816 (0,166) 0,209 (0,172)
Marriage rate at county level 0,169 (0,291) 0,289 (0,280)
AFQT score 0,387 (0,427) -0,387 (0,417)
Duration until first birth -0,722 (0,235) -0,592 (0,228)
Welfare generosity -0,081 (0,063) 0,072 (0,059)
Real family income in 1978 0,508 (0,374) -0,969 (0,435)
Predicted wage rate 0,792 (0,566) -1,470 (0,541)
A1 6,544 (1,158) 13,131 (1,437)
A2 2,188 (1,241) -1,456 (1,105)
A3 -1,523 (0,561) -1,226 (0,446)
Masspoint 1 [Probability 1] 1,965 [0,382]
Masspoint 2 [Probability 2] -1,216 [0,618]
N = 3715, LogLik = -5592.20
19Table 9: Specification without subsample of black women, with predicted wages and pre-
dicted family income. A1, A2, and A3 are the slope parameters of the hazard function.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Transitions 12&1 3:
First marriage First birth
before 1st birth before marriage
Covariates Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Intercept -3,379 (0,277) -2,943 (0,461)
White 0,235 (0,074) -0,237 (0,114)
Lived with both parents at age 14 0,041 (0,081) -0,572 (0,117)
Marriage rate at county level 0,387 (0,154) 0,660 (0,257)
AFQT score -0.332 (0.197) -0.148 (0.366)
Welfare generosity -0,098 (0,031) 0,201 (0,052)
Predicted family income -0,425 (0,044) -0,856 (0,078)
Predicted wage rate -0,742 (0,253) -0,662 (0,303)
A1 7,417 (0,369) 5,142 (0,506)
A2 1,415 (0,189) 0,428 (0,313)
A3 0,065 (0,372) 0,299 (0,805)
Masspoint 1 [Probability 1] 0,451 [0,795]
Masspoint 2 [Probability 2] -1,752 [0,205]
Transitions 34&3 5:
First marriage Second birth
a f t e r1 s tb i r t h b e f o r em a r r i a g e
Covariates Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Intercept -1,002 (0,649) -1,789 (0,841)
White 0,268 (0,167) -0,073 (0,197)
Marriage rate at county level 0,462 (0,361) 0,816 (0,500)
AFQT score 0,720 (0,714) -0,732 (0,698)
Duration until first birth -0,814 (0,307) -0,662 (0,379)
Welfare generosity -0,051 (0,082) 0,085 (0,095)
Predicted family income 0,313 (1,171) -0,354 (0,129)
Predicted wage rate 0,762 (0,714) -0,418 (0,853)
A1 5,948 (1,600) 12,263 (2,050)
A2 0,915 (1,678) -1,622 (1,829)
A3 -1,357 (0,840) -1,438 (0,871)
Masspoint 1 [Probability 1] 1,747 [0,419]
Masspoint 2 [Probability 2] -1,262 [0,581]
N = 3715, LogLik = -3890.53
20birth. These statistics are then computed for different values of predicted wages, predicted
family income, and the level of welfare generosity (AFDC). As can be seen from figures
2 - 6 these levels are denoted as percentages from their original level. For instance, where
the x-axis takes the value 0.6 the corresponding variable value is 60 percent more than the
original level. Likewise, at the axis value of -0.6 the original level has been reduced by 60
percent. The midpoint of the axis, which is zero, refers to the original level as given by the
sample data.
The simulation analysis is also useful for assessing the fit of the empirical model, since
the synthetic transitions historiescan be compared to the ones in the sample. Acomparison
of this sort is undertaken in table 4 where the simulated values are given in brackets. It
shows that the overall fit is quite good, and that the model is able to replicate the sample
histories in a satisfactory way, especially for white women. Slightly higher deviations are
apparent among the sub-sample of Hispanic and black women, which of course is due
to smaller sample sizes for these two groups. Also the model is considerable better in
predictingfamilyhistoriesofhighfrequencies,especiallyforthehistories1246and135.
Figure2 shows howthe proportion of out-of-wedlock childbearing varies with different
levelsofpredictedwages and welfare generosity. It shows a remarkable linear relationship,
where the effect of welfare benefits dominates the effect due to different levels of predicted
wages. This results is not surprising, since the negative predicted wage parameter is of
roughly the same magnitude for both premarital child bearing and marriage. So as pre-
dicted wages increase, less women experience out-of-wedlock childbearing. But at the
same time less women marry, increasing the proportion of women being at risk of having
a birth outside marriage. The net effect is therefore small, as can be seen from picture 2.
The AFDC levels, on the other hand, are positively associated with premarital childbear-
ing, and negatively associated with marriage, and has therefore a much larger effect on the
proportion of women having children outside marriage.
The response surface for black women (figure 3) is similar to that of white women,
although here the pattern is more non-linear and slightly more responsive to differences
in predicted wage levels, although the welfare effect still clearly dominates. More impor-
tant is the difference in the overall levels of premarital childbearing among white and black
women. Forblackwomentherangeofpremaritalchildbearingisfrom50percentto65per-
cent, compared to the maximum level among white women, which is as low as 32 percent.
Figure 4 shows simulated percentages of premarital childbearing as functions of pre-
dicted family income and predicted wages. Also here we see that predicted wages has
little effect, whereas the level of predicted family income has a strong impact. The latter
is driven by the fact that the negative family income parameter with respect to pre-marital
childbearing is twice the size of the parameter associated with the transition into marriage.
A similar pattern is evident for Black women (not shown here) with an equally important
effect of predicted family income.
Figure5showsthesurfaceofsimulatedpercentagesofwhitesinglemothers whomarry
before the end of the censoring date as a function of predicted wages and AFDC welfare
benefits. In order to assess this relationship first recall that predicted wages are positively
associated with marriage, while AFDC levels have a negative effect. In addition the dura-
21Figure 2: Simulated percentages of out-of-wedlock childbearing as a function of predicted
wages and AFDC generosity levels for white women.
22Figure 3: Simulated percentages of out-of-wedlock childbearing as a function of predicted
wages and AFDC generosity levels for black women.
23Figure 4: Simulated percentages of out-of-wedlock childbearing as a function of predicted
wages and predicted family income for black women.
24tionuntil first birth(i.e. theage)isnegativelyassociatedwithmarriage. Thislattervariable
is of course affected by predicted wages and AFDC levels in the initial family transition.
For instance high levels of predicted wages will delay first premarital birth, which in turn
reducesthelikelihoodofmarriagewhenbeingasinglemother. Thereisconsequentlyanin-
direct and negative effect of predicted wages that will reduce the positive direct effect. The
same mechanism will be present in terms of welfare generosity, although here the effects
will work in opposite directions. In neither case is the net effect easy to foresee without the
simulations. Picture 5 represents the net effect of these opposing forces. The shape of the
graph, although highly non-linear, suggest that the direct effects of the predicted wage and
AFDC levels dominate the indirect dynamic effect. This must be the case since the mar-
riage rate is highest when predicted wages are high and AFDC levels are low. Likewise,
the marriage rate is at the lowest when predicted wages are low and AFDC levels are high.
Figure 6 shows the response surface of the mean time spent as a single mother as a
function of predicted wages and predicted family income. It reveals a highly non-linear
and complex pattern. This is not entirely unexpected since our descriptive statistic now
also depends on the time dimension, as well as the incidence rate. The picture shows that
several combinations of predicted wages and predicted family income can reduce the time
spent as a single mother. The lowest level (2.73 years) is produced when both variables are
given lowvalues(lowerrighthand corner). But lowlevelsofthisstatistic are alsoachieved
when the predicted wage is assigned a high value together with a low value of predicted
family income.
Startinginthe lowerleft handcornerwherepredictedwageisatthemaximumleveland
predicted family income is at its lowest level, we can analyse the effects as the predicted
wage decreases, keeping the predicted family income constant at the low level. As the
predicted wages are reduced, the mean time spent as a single mother increases until the
predictedwage level isat theoriginal level, but then startstofall. Thisdecline, inconsistent
with the positive predicted wage parameters, is caused by the dynamic duration variable
which is negatively associated with marriage from single motherhood.
However, the pattern is dependent upon the level of predicted family income. For in-
stance when predicted family income is at the original level, the longest time spent as a
single mother is produced when predicted wage is reduced by thirty percent. When the
predicted family income is thirty percent higher than the original level, then the longest du-
ration is produced when the predicted wage is thirty percent lower than the original level.
7. Concluding remarks
This study, using data from the NLSY , has provided further evidence that young women’s
economic resources are important in the analysis of young people’s family formation be-
haviour. The findings suggest that both personal economic resources and family resources,
as well as welfare benefits, are important in explaining out-of-wedlock childbearing. In
particular we found that women from wealthy families tend to delay the family formation
process in general and were less likely to experience out-of-wedlock childbearing. We also
25Figure 5: Simulated percentages of white single mothers marrying before censoring date.
26Figure 6: Simulated mean time spent as a single mother as function of predicted wage rates
and predicted family income, white women.
27found that women with high earning potential delayed the family formation process. Gen-
erous welfare benefits seemed to increase the likelihood of becoming a single mother.
However, whenapremaritalbirthhastakenplacetheeffectoftheseeconomicresources
changes. Welfare generosity, for instance, does not appear to be of any great importance
after the woman has entered single motherhood. The predicted wage level, on the other
hand, becomes more important: women with high earnings potential marry quicker and
are considerably less likely to have a second out-of-wedlock birth. The predicted family
income, having a strong negative effect both on first marriage and premarital childbearing,
has only a modest effect after premarital birth has taken place.
The simulationanalysis provided insights into the process of out-of-wedlock childbear-
ing that could not easily be derived from the parameter estimates. For instance, although
women’s predicted wages are found to be negatively and statistically significant with re-
spect to pre-marital childbearing, they have almost no practical significance compared to
predicted family income as the two variables are varied. Also welfare income seemed to
have a stronger effect than predicted wages. For family formation events taking place after
out-of-wedlock childbearing, our simulations showed that the effect of economic resources
are highly non-linear and difficult to predict from the parameter estimates alone. For in-
stance, in terms of the mean time spent as a single mother we showed that this could be
minimised through several combinations of the variables capturing economic resources.
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29Appendix A. Econometric analysis
This section outlines the econometric model based on the structure of the family formation
processoutlinedearlier. Inthismodel wedefine continuouslydistributedlatent variatesu
lm
associated with the risk at the th transition of moving from state  to state , with   
  	
,   


. The conditional distributions (given covariates to
be introduced shortly) of the variates u
lm are denoted by distribution functions u
lm with
associated hazard functions denoted by:
u





where  is a vector of covariates, some of which may be time varying, and u is a
realisation of a transition number specific time invariant random variable,  u, included
to capture the influence of unmeasured covariates varying across individuals and assumed
to be distributed independently of the observed covariates. The corresponding conditional








In this competing risks model transition  from state  to state  is regarded as occurring
if u
ln   
 m9@l>m5Vu
lm. Accordingly the probability of exit from state  to state  at
transition intheageinterval	conditionalonobservedandunobservedcovariates












The likelihood function is specified accordingly. First note that women are observed from
age 3 (here age 13) until first entry into state 	 and 
, or until age  after which the event
history is censored. Let  	  be the number of transitions made by an individual, u be
age at transition , u   
  u  u￿4,  
 , and let ^F‘ if  is true and 
otherwise. Theloglikelihoodcontributionforanindividualmakingtransitionswithstate
occupancy history 4 5 6


 U.4 and transitions at ages 4 5 6


 U, time u













Note that all individuals start in state 4 and that all event histories are either right
censored or end with U.4  	 
. The likelihood contribution conditional on observed
covariates alone is the expectation of the likelihood contribution, given by integrating the
previous expression, with respect to the distribution of  u.
A variety of patterns of duration dependence in the hazard function is accommodated by
using a continuous piecewise linear functional form for the log hazard functions with two
knots, as employed by Newman and McCulloch. For let
     
  
30then the hazard function associated with passage from state  to state  at transition  is
u






in which   


, depending on whether allowance is made for across individual
heterogeneity and if so whether a univariate or bivariate specification is employed. For
example for  5 the hazard function is
u







The knot locations, 5 and 4> are fixed ap r i o r i . For    5  and 4 

(corresponding to ages  and ). For    5 	and 4  





be everywhere increasing or decreasing, or bathtub or inverted bathtub shaped. If u
6lm 
 then the associated duration distribution is defective with a non-zero probability of no
transition from state  to state  at transition .
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